Abstract-The problem of cascading failures in cyber-physical systems is drawing much attention in lieu of different network models for a diverse range of applications. While many analytic results have been reported for the case of large networks, very few of them are readily applicable to finite-size networks. This paper studies cascading failures in load-dependent finite-size geometric networks where the number of nodes is on the order of hundreds as in many real-life networks. In such networks, every node carries a certain amount of load in normal conditions, and maintains a load margin that enables handling a higher load up to a limit, if necessary. We investigate the impact of design parameters such as load margin, node density, and connectivity radius on network reaction to initial disturbances of different sizes. We quantify the damage imposed on the network, and derive lower and upper bounds on the size of this damage. Our finite-size analysis reveals the decisiveness and criticality of taking action within the first few stages of failure propagation in preventing a cascade. Furthermore, studying the trend of the bounds as the number of nodes increases indicates a phase transition behavior in the size of the cascade with respect to the load margin. We derive the critical value of the load margin at which such a transition occurs. The findings of this paper, in particular, shed light on how to choose the load margin appropriately such that a cascade of failures could be avoided.
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INTRODUCTION
A cascading failure in a complex network is a phenomenon in which the failure of a small set of nodes triggers the failure of successive nodes. There have been many types of cascading failure events that occurred in natural and man-made systems, from power grid and computer networks to political, economic, and ecological systems. Cascading failure is common in power grids, where a single failure of a fully loaded or slightly overloaded node (component) could set off more overloads, thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time. A few examples of power outages caused by cascading failures are the blackouts in northeast America in 2003 [1] , Italy in 2003 [2] , London in 2003 [3] , and northern India in 2012 [4] . Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet), when a crucial router or node becomes overloaded. Network traffic then needs to be rerouted through an alternative path. This alternative path, as a result, may become overloaded, causing path breakdown, and so on.
The problem of cascading failures in complex networks has been studied extensively [2] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . While the vast majority of the existing analytical studies are focused on large-scale networks, their findings can hardly be applied to the small or moderate size networks that we usually face in the real world. In this paper, we are concerned with providing rigorous analytical results for finite-size networks where the number of nodes is limited to a few hundreds, as is the case in many real-world applications.
To maintain tractability in analyzing cascading failures, random graphs are widely used in the literature to model complex networks [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] . Real-life networks are often spatial, that is, they have nodes and edges which are constrained by some geometry and are usually embedded in a two-or three-dimensional space. Transportation and mobility networks, Internet, mobile phone networks, power grids, social and contact networks, and neural networks, are all examples of spatial networks. Various mathematical models have been proposed for such networks, each suiting one group of applications better than others [22] . In this paper, we study cascading failures in geometric networks modeled by random geometric graphs, often considered as the simplest model for spatial networks [22] , [23] . In Section 2, we will explain the application of such graphs in investigating cascading failures in wireless networks and air transportation networks as two examples of geometric networks. Analyzing cascading failures in random geometric graphs not only provides useful intuitions into understanding and design of geometric networks, but also serves as an initial step towards studying more complicated models of spatial networks.
In addition to a network model, a contagion model is needed for studying cascading failures in a complex network. Depending on the underlying applications, different models of failure propagation have been considered in the literature, where two popular categories of propagation rules are the degree-based and load-based propagation models. In a degree-based propagation, the state of each node is determined by the states of all or part of its neighbors in the network [2] , [7] , [17] , [20] , [21] . For example, in [17] , each node is assigned a random threshold f, and it fails if at least a fraction f of its neighbors fail. On the other hand, in a load-based propagation, the state of a node is defined over the amount of load that it carries [5] , [18] . For instance in [18] , each node can carry a load up to its capacity, above which it becomes overloaded. An overloaded node fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors.
Many real-life networks such as wireless networks and air transportation networks could be considered as load-dependent networks. Each device in a wireless ad hoc network handles a load of data traffic; airports and sectors in an air transportation network accommodate a load of air traffic. To capture this feature, we adopt a load-based model where each node carries a certain load in normal conditions, but is also able to handle some higher load up to a certain capacity. If, for any reason, a node receives more load than its capacity, it fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors. The relative gap between the capacity and the normal load of a node is a design parameter denoted as load margin (also called tolerance parameter) [5] , [18] . Load margin plays a decisive role in the network's fate when it comes to cascades. A larger load margin is desired as it enables the network to handle more severe operation disturbances. However, a larger load margin leads to a larger unused capacity, imposing higher costs. Therefore, it is crucial to obtain a clear understanding of the impact of load margin on network reactions to disruptions of different scales. This is the subject of the study in this paper, where we characterize such reactions through analytical means in both finite and asymptotic regimes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain cascading failures in random geometric networks through two examples: wireless ad hoc networks and the air transportation network. We then formally state the problem and explain the main contributions of this paper in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide some notation and preliminaries helpful for understanding the analysis. Sections 5, 6, and 7 provide the main results and the bulk of the analysis. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
CASCADING FAILURES IN RANDOM GEOMETRIC NETWORKS
In graph theory, a random geometric graph (RGG) is constructed by randomly placing nodes in some metric space (according to a specified probability distribution) and connecting two nodes by a link if and only if their distance is in a given range [23] . In this section, we explain how random geometric graphs could be used to study cascading failures in two important examples of geometric networks, i.e., wireless networks and air transportation networks. This work serves as a preliminary step for studying cascading failures in other geometric networks.
Wireless Networks
Random geometric graphs have long been used as a mathematical model for wireless ad hoc networks (see [22] , [24] and references therein). In such networks, nodes are often distributed randomly and are able to transmit and receive signals to and from each other if they maintain a certain distance, which makes RGGs viable mathematical models for them. Cascading failures in wireless networks may occur due to many causes, among them are traffic overload and energy exhaustion [25] . These two cases are illustrated in Figs. 1a and 1b. In Fig. 1a , the traffic initially follows the (solid) route from node a to node b. Now, if this route becomes unavailable, for example, due to an attack (shaded region), a new route has to be configured between a and b. A large number of existing routing algorithms for wireless networks would form a new route that is very close to the shortest path between a and b [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] . Since connectivity of the nodes in RGG is based on their distance, this new route (dashed line in Fig 1a) will include some of the neighboring nodes of the attacked region, hence adding to the traffic load of these nodes. Now, if these nodes become overloaded, another route needs to be configured, and so on, leading to a cascade. Energy exhaustion could also cause a cascade of failures in wireless networks featured with energy sensitivity, such as wireless sensor networks. The small power supply of the sensor nodes compared to the complexity of the tasks they carry out, makes energy a very scarce resource in wireless sensor networks. Consider the sensor network of Fig 1b where node 1 fails due to energy exhaustion or some other reason. Then, the responsibilities of this node including sensing, processing, and communication will be distributed among its neighbors [30] , i.e., nodes marked by 2 in the figure. The increased operational load will make these nodes run out of energy in a much shorter time than originally intended (see chapter 8 in [30] ). When this happens, the aggregate responsibilities of nodes in 1 and 2 need to be taken over by the nodes marked by 3, exhausting their energy even faster. This may go on in a cascading event. Cascading failures in wireless networks due to traffic overload and energy exhaustion are both captured by the model considered in this paper.
Air Transportation Networks
In air transportation system, a sector could become saturated due to high traffic, or become unavailable for maintenance reasons or due to severe weather conditions. The air traffic control system then has to reroute the flights around the saturated or unavailable sector(s). The rerouted traffic may cause other sectors to become saturated, forcing the control system to reroute the traffic again. This could cause a cascade of failures similar to the one explained above for wireless networks. This problem is of primary concern in the air traffic control systems around the world [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] . Fig. 2 presents an example of how traffic is rerouted around regions with inclement weather conditions [33] . Fig. 3 shows another example of the alternative routes taken as flights avoid a low capacity region in the U.S [31] . As demonstrated in both figures, the neighboring sectors have to share the extra traffic. To capture this in a graphical model, Fig. 4 provides a graph representation of the flight sectors shown in Fig. 3 , in which the airports are represented as nodes. The edges represent a possible realization of "load sharing" between the regions by connecting the airports that are closer than a certain distance. For instance, the extra traffic of the saturated region in Fig. 3 (represented by a dashed circle in Fig. 4 ) could be distributed to the 5 airports connected to this region. As it can be seen from the examples shown in Figs. 2 and 3, geometry plays an important role in the topology of the load-sharing graph, allowing for application of random geometric graphs to model and analyze a cascade event in the air transportation network.
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we explain the models we use for the network, the initial disturbance, and the propagation of failures due to a disturbance. Furthermore, we introduce a method to quantify the overall damage caused by an initial disturbance. Given all that, we will formally state the problem and briefly discuss our main contributions.
Network Model
In this paper, we consider a network modeled by a random geometric graph Gð; RÞ, whose nodes are deployed in a region S according to a Poisson point process with density . There is an edge between each pair of nodes if their euclidean distance is less than R. We assume that S is a circular region with diameter D and centered at the origin 0, hence the average number of nodes in S is pD 2 =4. The results presented in this paper are independent of D and could be extended to other types of (non-circular) deployment regions with minimal changes. Initially, all the nodes carry the same amount of load l, and have the same capacity c ¼ al, where a ! 1 is the load margin. While the load of each node may change over time, the capacity remains the same. A node is called "healthy" if it carries a load less than or equal to its capacity. We should mention that in many reallife applications, such as the two networks described in the previous section, the load margin is not necessarily uniform throughout the network. However, our assumption helps to maintain the tractability of the analysis, while still enabling us to draw useful intuitions. Extending the results to more general cases could be the subject of future work.
Connected versus Disconnected Graphs: By definition, in a connected network, there exists a path between any two arbitrary nodes in the network. For Gð; RÞ, connectivity is only guaranteed when ! 1. In practice, however, the probability of connectivity could be arbitrarily close to 1 if is chosen large enough. Note that Gð; RÞ defines a probability space with a sample space consisting of all possible realizations of Gð; RÞ. For finite values of , let G c ð; RÞ be the connected subspace of the larger probability space Gð; RÞ, formed by all the connected realizations of Gð; RÞ. In our analysis, whenever connectivity is needed, we will consider G c ð; RÞ. In simulations, however, it is extremely time-consuming to check the connectivity of each realization. Based on the density rule from [35] , the dominant term in the probability of disconnectivity is the probability of a node being isolated, which is bounded from the above by expðÀpR 2 Þ. Therefore, in order to have a connectivity probability close to 1 in this paper, we assume ! 6=ðpR 2 Þ so that expðÀpR 2 Þ expðÀ6Þ ¼ 2:5 Â 10 À3 .
Initial Disturbance and Propagation of Failures
A dish attack on S is modeled by a circle A of radius R a < D=2 centered at the origin. This is shown in Fig. 5 . After the attack, all the nodes located at a distance r < R a from the center of attack will fail, and their load will be redistributed to their neighbors, which in turn may lead to a propagation of failures throughout the network. We assume that a dish attack only affects the nodes inside the dish, not the ones located on its border at r ¼ R a . We focus on the set of conditions under which a cascading failure is realized, and study the corresponding damage caused by such a cascade. We assume the following model for the propagation of failures. At any stage of cascade, when a node fails, its load will be redistributed equally among its healthy neighbors. A node that carries a total load greater than its capacity will fail.
Quantifying the Damage
The number of failures at each stage of load redistribution is clearly a random variable (r.v.). In order to quantify the impact of an attack on the network, we use the total number of failures outside the attacked region, caused by a limited dish attack. Let F denote this number. We define failure ratio as
where jS n Aj is the total number of nodes outside the attack region, including the nodes on A's boundary. We use the average value of the random variable f taken over all realizations of Gð; RÞ, denoted by f, to measure the impact of an attack. We are particularly interested in the variation of f with the load margin a. Fig. 6 shows f versus a for a typical dish attack on a network where R a ¼ R ¼ 0:1 and D ¼ 1, for different values of .
Main Results
As noted above, we discussed the insufficiency of the existing asymptotic analyses when applied to finite-size applications.
In this paper, we study the reaction of a finite-size network Gð; RÞ to a dish attack of an arbitrary radius R a by providing analytical results for f in terms of , R, R a , and the most important parameter, a. Finding the exact value of f in the finite regime could be very difficult and, if found, it may very well result in computationally intensive, if not intractable, arguments. Instead, we focus on deriving bounds with manageable computational complexity that help us understand the variations of f as the network parameters change. We summarized our main contributions as follows.
We start by investigating the first few stages of load redistribution after a dish attack, particularly finding the load redistributed to nodes in A 1 immediately after the attack. We extend this analysis to obtain an upper bound on the average failure ratio f, which especially helps us choose an appropriate value of a to avoid a cascade. In order to derive a lower bound, we consider a favorable scenario for absorbing the load redistributed from failed nodes, by assuming a desirable network topology and full node cooperation. It will be shown that, even in such an optimistic scenario, the chance to stop a cascade becomes smaller and smaller as the failures propagate through the network. This leads to a lower bound on f. The two bounds together provide us with insights into the speed and extent of a failure cascade through the network. Our analysis reveals the critical role of the first few stages of load redistribution in preventing a cascade. In other words, our results indicate that if a spread of failures is not contained immediately or within the first few stages, a cascade of failures would most likely bring down a large portion of the network. As seen from Fig. 6 , the failure ratio changes rather quickly over a short interval of a. It will be shown that this interval diminishes to zero as increases, indicating a phase transition phenomenon. Investigating the proposed upper bound on f as ! 1 reveals the existence of a threshold value of a, denoted as a U , such that f ¼ 1 if a < a U , and
We will derive a U in terms of other network parameters.
PRELIMINARIES
Here, we provide some notation and preliminaries required for the analysis. We denote the number of nodes in the attack region A by a. Note that a is a Poisson r.v. with parameter
It makes sense to assume that a dish attack is large enough to affect at least one node. Therefore, to have Prða ! 1Þ > 0:95, we assume a ¼ pR 2 a ! 3 in this paper. Consider the rings (annuli) of width R around the attacked region, as depicted in Fig. 5 . For i ! 1, we denote an annulus with inner radius R iÀ1 ¼ R a þ ði À 1ÞR and outer radius R i ¼ R a þ iR by A i , and the set of nodes in A i by A i . We denote the cardinality of A i by a i . Note that a i , which is the number of nodes in the ring A i , is simply a Poisson random variable with parameter
The following lemmas will help us in our sequential analysis, whose proofs are provided in the appendix.
a ! 3 and pR 2 ! 6, as assumed in this paper. We then have a i > 14; i ! 1:
Since a i is greater than 10, Lemma 1 implies that the Poisson r.v. a i could be well approximated by a Gaussian r.v. for i ! 1 [36] . This assumption will be used later in our analysis.
Consider two circles, one with radius r 1 centered at a distance a from the origin, and the other one with radius r 2 centered at a distance b. Also, assume that they are displaced from the origin at the same angle. We denote by Iða; r 1 ; b; r 2 Þ the intersection region of these two circles, while we use Iða; r 1 ; b; r 2 Þ to represent the area of this region, which could be obtained as [36] Iða; r 1 ; b; r 2 ÞÞ ¼ r
Lemma 2. Let u be a node located randomly and uniformly on Ið0; R a ; r v ; RÞ with r v ! R a , as shown in Fig. 7 . Also, let r be the random variable representing u's distance from the center of attack (i.e., the origin). Then the probability distribution function (PDF) of r is given as cðrÞ ¼ 
UPPER BOUND ON THE FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we turn our attention to a necessary condition for having a cascade of failures. A cascade of failures is possible only if at least one node outside the attack region fails due to the load redistribution. Otherwise, if the load of the attacked nodes in A is completely absorbed by the rest of the network, the propagation of failure does not occur. By finding the probability of this event, we could derive an upper bound on the average failure ratio. We start our analysis for finite-size networks by investigating the load received by nodes outside the attack region, immediately after the attack. This is the load received by immediate neighbors of the attacked nodes after the very first load redistribution. Note that this load is a random variable. Also, recall that the neighbors of the attacked region are all located in A 1 . We will first find the mean and standard deviation of the load received by these nodes. Having the statistics of this random variable, we then show that its distribution could be well approximated by a Gaussian random variable. Using such an approximation, we then find the probability of an overload for the nodes in A 1 , which later helps us find an upper bound on the average failure ratio. Recall that "average" here stands for an average taken over all graph realizations. Before pre senting the main result of this section, we need to state the following lemmas, whose proofs could be found in the appendix. We then have
where
Lemma 4. Consider a node v located at a distance r v 2 ½R a ; R a þ RÞ from the center of attack. Also consider a node u, a neighbor of v, located inside the attacked region at a distance r < R a from the center, as shown in Fig. 8 . The average load l u redistributed to v from u can be obtained as We are interested in finding cðrÞ, the PDF of the distance r of a node u located randomly and uniformly on Ið0; R a ; r v ; RÞ.
where gðÁÞ is defined in (9) 
If u is located randomly and uniformly on Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, we have
ðrÞ Â cðrÞ dr;
ðrÞ Â cðrÞ dr:
a , and (12) and (13) could be reduced to
Finally, given E½l u and E½l 2 u , the variance s 2 l u is given as
The following theorem applies the results of Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 to find the mean and variance of the load redistributed to a node at distance r v from the center of attack, right after the attack. 
where h ð1Þ ðrÞ is defined in (10), and s 2 l u is given by (15) . If R À r v ! R a , (16) and (17) are reduced to
where gðÁÞ is given by (9) , and
a . Now that we have the mean and variance of L v , an approximation of L v 's PDF could be obtained using the central limit theorem as follows. Note that
where N is the number of nodes inside Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, a Poisson r.v. with mean Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ. Given that N ¼ n, the nodes u ¼ 1; . . . ; n would be distributed randomly and independently on Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, making l u 's independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. Therefore, for large values of n, the central limit theorem asserts that the probability distribution of L v is well-approximated by a Gaussian random variable. In practice, however, n ! 5 is large enough to ensure a PDF very close to the normal random variable [36] . The following corollary is a formal statement of what we just explained. 
are given by (16) and (17), respectively. In particular, we have
where FðÁÞ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.
When Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ is small due to either or Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, the load received by v becomes very small. Since the Gaussian-approximated value for L v also becomes small in this case, the error in the approximation becomes negligible. The following theorem employs this fact along with Corollary 1 to find the probability of survival for the nodes in A 1 after the very first round of load redistribution.
Theorem 2. Let v be a node located randomly and uniformly on A 1 . Also, let p 1 be the probability that the load received by v is less than or equal to a À 1, i.e., p 1 , PrfL v a À 1g. Then, p 1 is obtained as
Note that L v and s Lv are functions of r v , given by Theorem 1.
Using the finding of Theorem 2, an upper bound on the average failure ratio can be obtained for finite values of . Theorem 3. The average failure ratio due to a dish attack of radius R a is upper-bounded as
is the density of nodes in A 1 , and p 1 is given by Theorem 2. Fig. 9 depicts the upper bound from Theorem 3 for different values of network parameters, where we also include the simulation results for the exact value of f. As seen, the proposed upper bound is especially helpful when it comes to picking a value of a to avoid a cascade. For example, for the network Gð ¼ 400; R ¼ 0:1Þ, the upper bound suggests that a ¼ 3 is a good choice to contain dish attacks of radius R a ¼ 0:1 or smaller. Fig. 10 shows how the upper bound changes with R a and a. As it is expected, when the attack area becomes larger, a higher value of the load margin is needed to stop the cascade. 
ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF UPPER BOUND AND THRESHOLD BEHAVIOR OF FAILURE RATIO
While Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on the failure ratio in finite-size networks, an asymptotic analysis of the upper bound could provide intuition regarding the behavior of a large network under attacks. As we will see, such an analysis reveals the threshold behavior of the failure ratio in terms of the load margin. For the case with ! 1, it could be shown that as the load margin increases above 1, the failure ratio drops from 1 to 0 at a critical value of the load margin. We will find such a critical value which could be very helpful when studying robustness of large networks to cascades. We start our analysis by finding what happens to the load L v in Theorem 1 when ! 1. In this section, in order to explicitly show the dependence of L v on r v , we use the notation Lðr v Þ instead of L v for the load received by node v located at r v . This slight modification will prove helpful in understanding the analysis.
Theorem 4. Consider a dish attack of radius R a applied to a network Gð; RÞ. Let Lðr v Þ be the load received by a node v located at a distance r v 2 ½R a ; R a þ RÞ from the center of attack, right after the attack. When ! 1, Lðr v Þ is no longer a random variable, and given as
where JðrÞ ¼ pR 2 À Iðr; R; 0; R a Þ.
Having the asymptotic value of Lðr v Þ from Theorem 4, a sufficient condition for a cascade of failures in the asymptotic case could be obtained as below.
Theorem 5. Consider a healthy node v located at r v ! R a after a dish attack of radius R a on Gð; RÞ where ! 1. Let
If a < a U and all the nodes located at r < r v have failed, then v will fail as well. Hence, a cascade of failures occurs throughout the network, resulting in f ¼ 1.
The following theorem combines the sufficient condition from Theorem 5 with a necessary condition for a cascade, proving a threshold behavior for the average failure ratio in the asymptotic regime.
Theorem 6. Consider a dish attack of radius R a applied to a network Gð; RÞ where ! 1. Let a U be the value of a given by (25) . Then, f ¼ 0 if a ! a U , and f ¼ 1 if a < a U . Fig. 11 demonstrates the evolution of the average failure ratio f as grows larger. It also shows the value of a U given by Theorem 5 for the asymptotic case. As it can be seen, a phase transition around a U becomes clear as increases. Fig. 12 shows the upper bound of Theorem 3 in terms of . As grows larger, this bound becomes tighter. The figure also shows the emergence of a phase transition. 
LOWER BOUND ON THE FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the failure ratio by analyzing a sufficient condition for the propagation of failures throughout the network. This condition is based on the fact that if a cascade cannot be stopped in the presence of a) full cooperation between nodes, and b) the most favorable connectivity condition, then for sure it cannot be stopped without them. We first provide the lower bound for finite-size networks.
Theorem 7.
Consider the connected subspace G c ð; RÞ of the probability space Gð; RÞ, introduced in Section 3. Suppose that a dish attack of radius R a is applied to G c ð; RÞ. Also, let q denote the ratio R a =R. If
, and FðÁÞ is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.
In practice, the summation in (27) needs to be calculated only for b2 ac or b3 ac terms. For that, let us consider the terms after k ¼ b3 ac in (27) . We have 
where (a) holds because we have FðÁÞ 1, (b) is obtained by applying the Chernoff bound to the Poisson tail probability [37] , 1 and (c) is due to our assumption of a ! 3 in this paper.
The small value 0.0205, when compared to 1, could be safely omitted for practical purposes. Before proving Theorem 7, we need to state a few lemmas. Recall the rings A i , i ! 1, in Fig. 5 . A cascade of failures, at each stage of its progress, goes through one of these rings. Let us look at how the failure propagates after the attack. After an attack on A, all the nodes that may potentially fail in the next step are the neighbors of A located in A 1 . If some of the nodes in A 1 fail, the next step of propagation includes some nodes in A 1 and A 2 . In general, if the failures have already been spread trough A 1 ; . . . ; A i , potential failures of the next step are all in
We know that a i 's are Poisson random variables with parameter a i 's given by (3). Lemmas 5 and 6 below establish a connection between a i 's and a. We use this connection later in Lemma 7 to prove a useful property in finding the lower bound. The proofs of all lemmas can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 6. For i ! 2, we have a iþ1 a i a i a iÀ1 :
Remark 1 (Gaussian approximation for a i ; i ! 1). Recall Lemma 1 and the discussion afterwards where we explained how our assumptions for pR 2 a and pR 2 lead to a i > 14, for i ! 1. This means that the Poisson r.v. a i is well approximated by a Gaussian r.v. with the same mean and variance as a i given by (3) . We use this approximation in proving the following lemma.
Lemma 7.
Given that a ¼ a 0 and a À 1 < 1=2 þ q, the following property holds for a i ; i ! 0
Using the preliminary results stated above, we obtain the following theorem regarding a total-failure cascade in a finite-size network, whose proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 8. Suppose a dish attack of radius R a is applied to G c ð;
RÞ. Given that a ¼ a 0 , if a À 1 < 1=2 þ q, the probability that all the nodes fail is lower-bounded by Prfa 0 > a 1 ða À 1Þg. 1. An upper Bound for the tail probability of a Poisson random variable X $ PoiðÞ can be derived using a Chernoff bound argument [37] :
, for x > .
We can write f !
where ðaÞ is due to Lemma 8, and ðbÞ follows from the Gaussian distribution of a 1 and Poisson distribution of a. t u Fig. 13 depicts the lower bound from Theorem 7 along with the simulation result for the average failure ratio. The upper bound from Theorem 3 is also shown for comparison. As we see, the two bounds together successfully predict the interval within which the failure ratio decreases from 1 to 0.
Asymptotic Analysis of the Lower Bound
Here, we look at the lower bound obtained previously from an asymptotic point of view. As grows very large, similar to what was observed for the upper bound in Section 6, the lower bound takes the shape of a step function. That is, there exists a value of a, denoted as a L , such that f takes the value of 1 for a < a L , and it takes the value of 0 for a ! a L . The following theorem derives the value of a L . Theorem 8. Consider the probability space Gð; RÞ when ! 1. Suppose that a dish attack of radius R a is applied to Gð; RÞ. Also, let q denote the ratio R a =R. If
all the nodes would fail.
Fig. 14 depicts the variation of a L over q ¼ R a =R. As seen, a L grows sub-linearly with R a =R. It is important to note that given R and R a , a L and a U will not be equal. In other words, unlike the upper bound, our proposed lower bound is not tight asymptotically. The following lemmas help us prove Theorem 8. While Lemma 6 holds for the asymptotic case, Lemma 9 below is the asymptotic version of Lemma 5. Also, Lemma 10 below can be interpreted as the asymptotic version of Lemma 7. The proofs can be found in the appendix. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8. The proof is mostly along the same lines as for Lemma 8 with a few minor changes. First note that as grows very large, the network becomes connected. So there is no need to consider the subspace G c ð; RÞ here. Second, a is given as the initial number of failed nodes due to the attack. However, when ! 1, a tends to a. Similarly, a i tends to a i for i ! 1. Just like Lemma 8, in the best scenario, a 1 ða À 1Þ is the excess capacity available to absorb the load from the a failed nodes. If a À 1 < q 2 =ð1 þ 2qÞ, then we have a > a 1 ða À 1Þ. In this case, A 1 cannot absorb the load of A, and the aggregate load of a þ a 1 needs to be absorbed by the rest of the nodes. However, Lemma 10 asserts that such an absorbtion will not be realized as the failure propagates through A 2 , A 3 , and the outer rings until it takes out the whole network. t u
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the problem of cascading failures in finite-size networks modeled by random geometric graphs. Rigorous analytical results have been provided for studying the incurred damage under a dish attack of a given size. In particular, the average failure ratio due to the attack was studied in terms of the load margin, which is a critical design consideration in real-life networks. By deriving the lower and upper bounds on the average failure ratio, we were able to track the network reaction to different attacks. The asymptotic analysis of both bounds has also been presented. Particularly, the asymptotic analysis of the upper bound revealed the threshold behavior of the network reaction to the changes in the load margin. Our findings can be exploited to choose appropriate values of the load margin to avoid a cascade in a given network.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. First note that for
For i ! 2, a i is equal to times the area of A i . Since the area of A i is clearly larger than that of A iÀ1 , we obtain a i ! a iÀ1 , which along with (35) leads to
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the angleû in Fig. 7 and the arc of radius r associated withû crossing over the node i. Let us denote the length of this arc by v. The PDF of r can be obtained by considering the probability of node i being located inside the tiny area between the dashed lines, thus we have cðrÞ ¼ 2v Ið0; R a ; r v ; RÞ :
Givenû, v can be found as v ¼û Â r. Now we only need to findû. Note thatû is an angle in a triangle with sides r, r v , and R. Particularly,û is opposite to the side of length R. Therefore, we havê
The equation above holds when r þ r v > R. For the case r þ r v R, we simply haveû ¼ p. t u
Proof of Lemma 3. We first have
Since d u $ Poið u Þ, we have
Therefore,
To find a closed-form for the summations above, we have
For the expression under the integral, we could use the Taylor expansion of an exponential function as
Substituting (44) into (43) yields (9) . Note that the integral in (9) could be evaluated numerically. Along the same lines, we could find the following for the summation in (42):
Substituting (45) 
If i is located randomly and uniformly on Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, the probability density function of its distance from the center is given by cðrÞ at (6) . Applying cðrÞ to find E½h ð1Þ ðrÞ and E½h ð2Þ ðrÞ by taking average over r leads to (12) and (13) . When R À r v ! R a , the attacked region entirely resides in v's neighborhood, hence, the averaging of (12) or (13) over r is no longer needed, and we obtain (14) .
t
; R; 0; R a Þ Á . Let l u ; u ¼ 1; . . . ; N, denote the sequence of r.v.'s corresponding to the load redistributed to v by its neighbors. As it has been shown in the proof of Lemma 4, l u completely depends on a Poisson point process outside Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ, whereas N is given by a Poisson point process inside Iðr v ; R; 0; R a Þ. Hence, N and the random variables l u ; u ¼ 1; . . . ; N are independent. Therefore, we can write
where ðaÞ follows from Wald's identity [36] and the fact that a Poisson point process, given the number of points, becomes a uniform point process. Also, ðbÞ follows from replacing E½l u with (12) from Lemma 4. Similarly, for s L we have
When R À r v ! R a , A is entirely included in v's neighborhood. Thus, E½N ¼ pR 2 a , and E½l u is given by (14) , together leading to (18) . 
will have a negligible effect on the value of p 1 . Applying such an approximation leads to (21) .
t u
Proof of Theorem 3. Since 0 f 1, we have
where p 0 , Prfno failures in A 1 g. Note that p 0 is the probability that the load received by every node in A 1 is less than a À 1. Let us denote by P ðkÞ the probability that there are k nodes in A 1 . Also recall that p 1 is the probability that the load received by a node located randomly and uniformly in A 1 is less than a À 1. We then have
Substituting p 1 above by its value given by Theorem 2, and then substituting (51) into (50), we obtain (22) . t u
Proof of Theorem 4. In order to prove the theorem, we will
show that as ! 1, we have s L v ! 0, and E½Lðr v Þ takes the righthand side of (24) . First note that when ! 1, by applying the L'Hopital's rule [36] to (10) and (11) 
Substituting (52) into (16) gives us the asymptotic average of Lðr v Þ in (24) . Now let us show that the asymptotic value of s Lv tends to 0. Using (12), (13) , and (15), we find that 
Proof of Theorem 5. In the best case, let us assume that all the nodes located at r > r v are healthy and have received no load so far. We will show that v still fails in this case. Note that this assumption is equivalent to having a dish attack of radius r v ! R a . Let us denote by LðrÞ and L 0 ðrÞ the asymptotic load distribution right after the attack for attacks of radius R a and r v , respectively. Since the latter is a larger attack, we have
Therefore, node v fails. Applying the same procedure to nodes located at r > r v results in a propagation of failures throughout the network, leading to
Proof of Theorem 6. Looking at (24) in Theorem 4, it could be concluded that in the asymptotic case the closer a node is to the attack region (i.e., the smaller r v is), the larger is the load it receives right after the attack. Therefore, we have LðR a Þ > Lðr v Þ, for r v > R a . Consequently, for a ! a U , we have
which means that none of the nodes in A 1 would fail. Hence, there will not be any propagation of failures, resulting in f ¼ 0. It remains to prove that a cascade of failures is assured when we have a < a U . In this case we have LðR a Þ ¼ a U À 1 > a À 1, which means that every node located at R a would fail. Now, by simply applying Theorem 5 for r v ¼ R a , we have
Proof of Lemma 5. We need to show that
However, (59) is given by the lemma's assumption, which completes the proof. t u Proof of Lemma 6. We need to show that
If we set
could be deduced from the "inequality of arithmetic and geometric means" [38] , asserting that for two nonnegative numbers x 1 and x 2 we have
Now that (30) is proved, (31) could be obtained by simply applying the second item of Lemma 5. t u
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove the theorem by induction. For i ¼ 0 the equality holds. Let us assume that the theorem holds for i ¼ k À 1; k > 1; we prove that it holds for i ¼ k as well. We have
where (a) holds by applying Lemma 6 and the Gaussian distribution of a i ; i ! 1, and (b) holds due to the induction's assumption made for i ¼ k À 1. t u
Proof of Lemma 8. Here, a 0 is given as the initial number of failed nodes due to the attack. At its best, a 1 ða À 1Þ is the excess capacity available to absorb the load of these a 0 failed nodes. Now consider a best-case load distribution strategy where all the nodes in A can collaborate and all the nodes in A 1 are connected to A. Then, nodes in A can distribute their loads equally among the nodes in set A 1 in order to use all the excess capacity and avoid a cascade. If a 0 > a 1 ða À 1Þ, A 1 cannot absorb the load of A, and the aggregate load of a 0 þ a 1 needs to be absorbed by rest of the nodes. However, Lemma 7 asserts that such an absorbtion becomes even less likely, and the failure propagates through A 2 , A 3 , and the outer rings until it takes out the whole network. Therefore, the probability of a total failure is lowerbounded by Prfa 0 > a 1 ða À 1Þg. t u
Proof of Lemma 9. In order to prove the first item, note that we have
Moving on to prove the second item, given that a 1 ða À 1Þ < a 0 , it suffices to show that
From Lemma 5, we already know
To complete the proof, we only need to show that (63) leads to (65), i.e., we need to have
Inequality (66) can be rewritten as
which always holds since q > 0. This completes the proof. t u
Proof of Lemma 10. The proof is simple and is given by induction on i. First, note that for i ¼ 1, the case is proven by Lemma 9. Now suppose that the statement is true for
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